How Should the United States Define Success in Iraq?

Petaquilla Copper Back in the early 1990's several groups, mostly Canadians, obtained concessions to exploit mineral deposits in the Republic of Panama.

I think that it is very sensitive issue but it should be solve very caefully ,alot of depend on this issue especially the concept of peaceful world depend on it very much.

It is look like testkin type of concept required to solve thisissue

I don't think the United States can define the word success in Iraq. I don't think they've made any success there. The success in Iraq would be pulling out the American troops before they die. There is too much terrorism in the country, and American soldiers aren't going to be able to change the whole country and stop violence from happening. It's pretty much human nature to want to have the most power and have control over others. Islamic terrorists love having power and will continue to show their power over the innocent civilians in Iraq.

Either we do the morally right thing or just we don't. In general, debates over procedures, tactics and strategy when it comes to the wrong thing (in this case, the war in Irak) are useless.
We should leave ASAP. No justifications, no continuation of a failed policy from the previous administration. There is no reason for us to be in Irak, so we should end all speculation and start bringing the troops home in January 2009.
Lasting Success can only be achieve when we do the right thing. What could stop us? Only fear.

The question of what is success with regard to the Iraq War is one I pose to friends often--especially to those who strongly support staying in Iraq and continue to look back and believe going into Iraq remains fully justified (usually ignoring the WMD justification). I ask them the question because I have a very difficult time answering it with honesty.

I agree with the view that "success" can best be understood by Iraq's sustainable economic growth. But without understanding the history of the region and our own government, the war in Iraq will feel unsuccessful in many ways.

This war has been couched in terms unlike wars we've before felt we won--WWII, the Revolutionary War. Here, we entered to stop the use of WMD's. Our premise for success has been stripped away and replaced with the stopping of tyranny for the Iraqi people. Without discussing the merits of the justifications for entry themselves, it is that shift--from what we first justified the war (WMD's) to what we now justify it with (stopping tyranny to create a democracy)--that creates the problem.

Previously America's wars have been cast in ideological terms, usually between clearly distinct nations for capitalism/communism, or wars were over land or one nation's sovereignty. The Iraq War is one of two in the overall War on Terrorism, and if the War on Terrorism operates as our past wars have, success would be the world's prevail against terrorism. But what would that look like? No more terror? Only slight amounts? My point is that the way our previous wars were couched lent themselves to a line of success: the nation won the land, gained sovereignty, or capitalism/democracy prevailed over communism/tyranny (where you could see a tide of nations turning toward one or another).

In this situation, we can try to limit the definition of success to the War in Iraq, in order to give it parameters, but it will not look like the wars previous. For example, the above attempts to define success cite it as: stability, rule of law, democracy, defeating Al Qeda, preventing Iraq from becoming a base for terrorism, preventing mass communal violence, sustainable economic development, etc. Doubtless, each are good principles to guide US action--but most of these are generic and very American principles of good government that are somewhat void of historical reality.

Of course, I do not know of any nation that is not seeking to create its sustainable economic development--so that one stands alone as a universal meter by which we can gauge success.

But for the others: history shows that this region has only been stable through the rule of force, not rule of law. Israel is the only democracy in the region, and it was recently supplanted (or replanted). And I'm trying to remember anytime when the successful "prevention" of anything (whether a terrorism base, communal violence, et al) for the time being truly felt like success to the preventers (accordingly, "preventing Iraq from becoming a base of terrorism" or "preventing mass communal violence" feels like necessary maintenance, not affirmative success).

The wars in which people feel like they succeed are those in which there are visible affirmative gains: turning back the Nazi's and taking out Hitler, halting and turning back the British gaining American independence, etc.

So, in light of history and a common sense understanding of what can be perceived as a successful war, the US seemingly needs to gain something. What can that gain possibly be?

To be honest: an ally in the region, on whom we can depend for oil. This would help toward Iraq's achieving sustainable economic growth (assuming good investment, dispersal of profit, and barrels of oil are still expensive), which could then fund education. Once educated, the society might be more willing to themselves seek a true and stable democracy (democracy seems to be a form of government that must began by being sought by the people--imposition from outside government or force seems antithetical to the process and what democracy requires of its citizens). ["ally and oil" would of course have been horrible and unjustified reasons for war, but we don't really have anything better at this point].

I am not arguing that Iraq is incapable of the rule of law. Nor that it is incapable of democracy. However, I do believe before either rule of law or democracy will be able to occur, rule of force will be the only means by which enough stability will be obtained to educate the populace and give them the economic incentive to abide by the rule of law, which can then establish a democracy.

Long-term: these things are obtainable, but they must be obtained by the Iraqi people themselves. That seems to be a necessary component of a budding democracy and good government. Our founding fathers weren't wrong in being incredibly proud that we were able to accomplish this for ourselves--and it is that pride and reverence for our past that helps sustain stability in our democracy, in which our economy's incentivizing of education and the rule of law are what maintain our growth and peace. We cannot overlook the importance of self-starters and economic incentives that are universally appealing. Simply: they work.

So, the bottom line: economic incentives toward the establishment of stability. rule of law, and democracy through education and capitalism. We must look to define "success" long term, because that will be the only way we will see and perceive true affirmative gain.

I liked both responses to the debate question. I thought Jeff provided an excellent focus on security conditions and imperatives, and Ysbrant's discussion of economic concerns is a welcome and overdue addition to these debates. Might I invite comment, however, on the political benchmarks for success that the Administration has outlined? Are acts of political compromise at the national level among Iraqis necessary for reconciliation but separate from how we as Americans should define our own concept of success in Iraq?

In order to define success in Iraq, one must decide what the United States' goals are in Iraq. If the goal for the United States is to score a tactical victory against the global Sunni jihadist movement, then victory comes by defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq and preventing the emergence of a vacuum for al-Qaeda to re-emerge inside Iraq. The United States has essentially succeeded in reaching this goal. The problem is that this goal does not go far enough in securing the United States' long-term strategic interests or ensuring American security.

True victory in Iraq does not come when things are quiet and Americans do not hear about violence in the news. Certainly, it would be easier for the United States to declare victory and go home now that the American military and Iraqi Security Forces have achieved brilliant and hard-fought successes in bringing relative security to Iraq. To do so at this point would repeat the same mistake that the United States made in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Thousands of Americans – and countless others around the world – would pay the price for that mistake.

The United States' interests would be best served with a strong, stable, and pluralistic Iraq is able to govern itself effectively and independently. Such a country would not require a US presence and would indeed act to bring security and stability to the Middle East, in much the same way as South Korea, Japan, and Germany help do so in their respective regions. Though these countries' interests do not always align with the Untied States' interests, they do so most of the time. Just as a strong Japan is able to act as a bulwark against North Korea's nefarious activities, a strong Iraq would act as a natural bulwark against Iranian malign influence. This success is admittedly a higher threshold, but it is attainable and necessary, especially when one contemplates the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran.

To achieve this success will require a strong Iraqi state, which will in turn demand refocused American efforts on governance, rule of law, and capacity-building around the country. These efforts will put the United States in the often uncomfortable (but necessary) position of placing a lot of pressure on its allies within the government of Iraq to make sure that they respect the political process and do not intimidate their political opposition. It will not mean that the United States must deviate from its tradition of putting all its chips behind one political horse and instead put all its chips behind ensuring the legitimacy of the Iraqi political process.

To focus solely on helping provide security will be a mistake. If the United States sought only to insure Iraqi security, there would have been no need to topple Saddam Hussein or to instate a democratic political process. Many American servicemen and women gave their lives because of that decision. To forfeit the benefits that come along with a legitimate political process would be to lay waste to the sacrifice made those young men and women made for the United States and would make it more likely that more young Americans will be called on to fight avoidable wars in the future.